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Article 4

COMMENTARY/Current Problems in Securities
Regulation*

MANUEL F. COHEN**

As any securities lawyer, investor, or for that matter, individual in our wellinformed society knows, problems exist today in the area of securities regulation. Among these we find that achievement of completely effective disclosure-the cornerstone of prudent and intelligent investment-still lies
beyond our reach. In one sense, of course, this problem is not current.
It has been around since Adam failed to serve a prospectus on Eve, or
vice-versa. But the enormous strides in sophistication and complication of
business have created more bruises on the old apple, and it is getting harder
every day to know which bruise is worth reporting and when.
Other problems-the fantastic rise of institutional investing," the take-over
craze and its "funny money,"' 2 the introduction of block trading,3 the impact
* This commentary is an adaptation of a speech delivered at the First Symposium
on Securities Regulation at the Southwestern Legal Foundation, held in Dallas, Texas,
April 23-26, 1969.
** Of the firm of Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Former Chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission; Lecturer in Securities Law and Regulation at George
Washington University, Washington, D.C.; Member of the New York and District of
Columbia Bars; B.S., Brooklyn College, 1933; LL.B., Brooklyn Law School, 1936.
1. Enstam and Kamen, Control and the Institutional Investor, 23 Bus. LAw. 289
(1968); Loomis, They're Tearing Up Wall Street, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 1969, at 88; Louis,
The Mutual Funds Have the Votes, FORTUNE, May 1967, at 150; Rustin, Little Profit
on Small Investors, Wall Street J., July 31, 1969, at 4, col. 1.
2. Once upon a time, corporate securities transactions were negotiated using cash
(i.e., money). Later, stock was elevated to the status of cash, and corporate stock transactions were accepted as part of the ordinary. For a myriad of reasons, including tax
considerations, the collective corporate genius devised hybrid securities (notes with
warrants attached; subordinated convertible debentures; etc.) and packages of securities,
including traditional "money" as well as the new evidences of money interests, with
which to structure corporate transactions. "Funny money," like the term "Chinese
money," is frequently used to describe the nontraditional elements of financing packages. Many people no doubt could claim the honor of coining the "funny money"
term, but upon which man the accolade should fall is unknown. For discussion of
the take-over craze and the use of "funny money" see Brown, United Fruit's Shotgun
Marriage, FORTUNE, April 1969, at 132; Burck, The Merger Movement Rides High,
FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 79; Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven:
The Limitations of the Anti-Merger Act, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 1231 (1968); Loomis, Ten
Conglomerates and How They Grew, FORTUNE, May 15, 1969, at 152; Businessmen in
the News-The Biggest, Wildest Merger Year Ever, FORTUNE, June 15, 1968, at 43.
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of back office breakdown 4 -are newer, but no less current. The emergence
of mutual funds, life insurance companies, and banks as money managers
for the whole population of investors; the conglomeration of industry at a
greater speed than the market and the investor can sensibly follow; the
sheer vitality and ingenuity of today's money managers-these too create
today's problems and challenges.
The list of problems runs on and, if I am going to do more than catalogue them, some pruning is in order. This commentary will focus on the
areas of disclosure, conglomerates, and institutional investment. Each crossfertilizes the other, but each deserves individual consideration.
Disclosure

Disclosure has been a problem, and will continue to be one, as long as
there are traders who swear by caveat emptor. In point of fact, the common
law long ago beat the government to this topic and every lawyer knows that
the ancient tort of fraud and the common law of fiduciary loyalty will catch
an errant client just as surely as the modem sanctions found in the federal
securities statutes. 5 Lest there be any doubt about it, we have Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp.6 The common law, however, is made by judges who
have to wait patiently for plaintiffs and, in recent years, the SEC has proven
to be somewhat more eager. 7 My interest, however, has been primarily in the
federal area of fair-trading rules, and consequently I will leave the nonfederal aspects of disclosure for illumination by others.
A basic responsibility of the Securities and Exchange Commission is to
insist upon a situation whereby those interested in securities can arrive at
informed decisions. Except for certain limited situations, the Government
does not intervene; it does not determine the value of, circumstances per3. Loomis, supra note 1, at 137; Battling the Big Board to Serve the Big Traders,
Bus. WEEK, June 14, 1969, at 104.
4. Loomis, supra note 1, at 88; Louis, Flood Warnings on Wall Street, FORTUNE,
Aug. 1968, at 98; Note, The Back Office Problem and the Anti-Trust Laws, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 299 (1969); Blue Days for Brokers, TIME, Aug. 15, 1969, at 71.
See generally Loomis, Big Board, Big Volume, Big Trouble, FORTUNE, May 1968, at
146.
5. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-jj (1964); Securities
Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1964). See also Jennings, Insider Trading in Corporate Securities: A Survey of Hazards and Disclosure Obligations Under Rule 10b-5,
62 Nw. U.L. REV. 809 (1968).
6. 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947).
7. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) [Certiorari
was denied to two individual defendants, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)]. See also In re
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, and Smith, Inc., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,629 (1968);
Loomis, The SEC Has a Little List, FORTUNE, Jan. 1967, at 111; Businessmen, the Law
and Ethics, FORTUNE, Oct. 1968, at 39.
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mitting sale of, or methods of distributing securities issues. Of course the
Commission exercises certain functions to further the goal that the markets
and those operating in them for or on behalf of the public measure up to
accepted standards. In simpler terms, the object of all SEC activity is to
provide a fair trade for the trader.
Disclosure is a more subtle problem than most of the case law-even the
recent cases-suggests. Insider trading on clearly material and undisclosed
facts creates an easy case. A harder question involves defining what amount
to "material" facts, and perhaps the most difficult questions of all lie in
deciding the timing and necessary content of disclosure attempts. 8 Disclosure problems are not limited to the category of information withheld.
Equal disruption of fair trading can result from excessively casual or inaccurate reporting which can induce an investor to take a position in a
security with unfounded high hopes, later to learn he has bought a generous
supply of wallpaper. 9 The name of the disclosure game, therefore, is not
just "too little, too late." It can also be "too much, too soon." One of my
favorite stories illustrates this point.
There were a captain and a first mate on a ship. The first mate drank to
excess, but he was trying to reform. He had really cut down on his drinking, when one day he slipped a bit. It was the captain's turn to make the
entry in the ship's log that day and he wrote, "The first mate was drunk
today." This upset the first mate and he argued with the captain that,
after all, he had been on his good behavior, and that it was discouraging
to have this entry made about him. The captain said, however, that the
first mate could not argue the fact, since it was true and the mate couldn't
deny it. The next day it was the first mate's turn to keep the ship's log.
His entry read, "The captain was sober today."
The short of the matter is that disclosure should not be viewed simply
as a set of rules which, if followed, allow everything else to be sublimated.
Disclosure is more fundamentally a principle which seeks to create an
atmosphere for informed trading. The rules of disclosure stand to enforce
the principle. Like all rules, they shift and change as the infinite ingenuity
of the marketplace creates new types of deals which give birth to new categories of investor-oriented information. But the principle remains constant.
The ultimate goal of the disclosure principle is not merely to force ad8. See Bromberg, CorporateInformation: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications,
22 Sw. L.J. 731 (1968); Wiesen, Disclosure of Inside Information-Materiality and
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 28 MD. L. REV. 189 (1968); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Expanding Concepts of Corporate Disclosure under SEC Rule 10b-5, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
425 (1969); Note, Texas Gulf Sulphur: Its Holdings and Implications, 22 VAND. L.
REV. 359 (1969).
9. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Const. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
Comment, BarChris: Due Diligence Refined, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1411 (1968).
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herence to specific disclosure rules, but to promote the continuous and timely
sharing of information which matters to investors. A measure of the widespread understanding of this principle is the typical comment by the uninitiated: "Why, if everyone knew what I do, I wouldn't be able to make
any money." That's right; that's what it is all about. Today's corporations
and money managers are by and large the leading exponents of the disclosure
principle. Their adherence to the principle is proven by the relative shortage of cases dealing with violation of disclosure rules.
Even assuming a bona fide desire to contribute to informed investor
choice, however, the one who holds the information to disclose has problems
today. Some problems arise from the tough area of judgment calls where
the question is what is material and when. 10 Honest men honestly differ
on these matters, and to a certain extent there may be no correct answer.
The market makes a fool of us all in time, some say, and twenty-twenty
hindsight makes judgment calls seem deceptively simple. We have come
a long way in corporate responsibility, and the fact that corporations know
when judgment is required is good proof that fair trading is an attainable,
albeit elusive goal.
Disclosure and the Growth of Conglomerates
Obstacles to informed trading remain, and some of them are of man's own
making. This leads me to my second area of discussion: conglomerates.
Back in 1966, before L'Affaire Litton, I was-as a federal employeeconcerned about the special disclosure problems created by conglomerates,
but my speeches on the subject went largely unheard. Many conglomerates
operated then, as now, in divisional structures with capital packages keyed
to operating results reported under the parent organization's name. No
one has to be told now that such reporting can lead to problems."
The quality and extent of corporate reporting by conglomerate entities
is, of course, only one of the current problems posed by conglomerates.
It may also be one of the relatively simple problems to cure. By and
large the problem is resolved by breaking down parent organization financial
statements to show operating results for its different business segments.
Certain technical problems are raised by a requirement for such breakdowns. Threshold questions involve what constitutes a different business
segment or "line of products.' 2 Performance statistics within corporate
10. See articles cited supra note 8.
11. Burck, supra note 2; Davidow, supra note 2, at 1280; Louis, The Accountants
are Changing the Rules, FORTUNE, June 15, 1968, at 177; Loomis, supra note 2.
12. Schwartz, Legal Implications of Product Line Reporting, 23 Bus. LAW. 527
(1968); Sommer, Conglomerate Financial Reporting, 23 Bus. LAW. 521 (1968).
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divisions or with respect to different lines of products are not always simple
to establish because of intracompany services and products and allocation
of overhead, research and development and administrative costs. Nonetheless, these technical difficulties are surmountable, and it is important
to recognize that improvement in the quality of conglomerate disclosure is
an issue apart from questions about the fundamental desirability of con13
glomerate growth.
One of the most popular methods by which conglomerates grow is the
tender offer, or takeover bid. This mechanism, for reasons I will explain,
creates some of the same basic disclosure problems as the lack of standardized reporting formats. 14 There are reasons for the popularity of tender
offers. These include speed, simplicity, and also--of particular significance- the fact that, unlike a negotiated merger, the concurrence of existing
management is not required.' 5 Unfortunately, insufficient disclosure is often
made. In this respect the two other principal methods by which control
of a company is changed, the proxy contest and the negotiated merger or
purchase of assets, differ from the tender offer. With these other methods,
stockholders are required to vote and the consequent application of the proxy
rules serves to provide full disclosure. Before the Williams bill' 6 was enacted
there was no express provision of law which affirmatively required adequate
disclosure in the case of tender offers. The antifraud rules of the securities
statutes and other relevant laws were the sole tools available to the Commission and to persons aggrieved. The offeror could mask his identity, his
plans, and his purposes.' 7 Investors were thus confronted with the necessity
of making an important investment decision-the determination whether to
sell their shares, or keep them-without disclosure of material facts. The
problem is compounded by the fact that the tender offeror usually wishes to
bring all possible pressure on investors to decide quickly, without reflection,
and indeed without opportunity to consider relevant and material information. The appeal is to get aboard the band wagon immediately or lose the
13. Since the date of these remarks the Commission has adopted rules which require

registrants and their subsidiaries to disclose "the approximate amount or percentage of
total sales and operating revenues and of contribution to income before income taxes
and extraordinary items attributable to each line of business which contributed, during
either of the last 2 fiscal years, a certain proportion to (1) the total of sales and revenues, or (2) income before income taxes and extraordinary items." 34 Fed. Reg.
12176 (1969).

14. See CCH

FED. SEC.

L.

REP.

77,729 (1969).

15. See generally McDonald, The New Game of Business, FORTUNE, May 15, 1969,
at 143, 286; O'Hanlon, Goodrich's Four-Ply Defense, FORTUNE, July 1969, at 110; How
to Fend Off a Take-Over, FORTUNE, Feb. 1969, at 83. See also Greenfield, Regulation
of Contested Cash Tender Offers, 46 TEXAs L. REV. 915 (1968).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (Supp. IV, 1969).
17. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See also articles cited supra
note 15.
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opportunity to participate in what is made to appear an attractive offer. The
creation of such a situation is totally inconsistent with the basic philosophy of
the federal securities laws that investors should be furnished with full disclosure of material facts and given the opportunity to make an unhurried
investment decision upon the basis of such disclosure. What I have described above is hopefully a thing of the past since passage of the Williams
bill and the drafting of Commission rules' 8 which implement its provisions.
The Williams bill, however, can stand improvement, and other problems
concerning tender offers remain.' 9
To the extent that the take-over creates a disclosure problem, it too is
susceptible to fairly painless correction. Some of the speed of a take-over
may be lost in the process, but the gain in sensible investor choice amply offsets the loss. The threat of a take-over, or an actual take-over, can do
much to shake antediluvian managements out of their complacency. Where
this results in a more creative use of corporate resources, whether by existing
management or by others, the take-over bid or threat can achieve desirable
goals. My commitment to full disclosure recognizes that such cases may
slow down, slightly, the speed of the impact, but it in no way kills the advantage.
Further Problems with Conglomerates
The issues involved in conglomerate growth-and block trading is yet another
issue-are, for the most part, securities problems. The federal legal structure
does not ask or allow the Commission to resolve the policy issues arising out
of the rapidly increasing concentration of wealth and power in our society.
At the moment there is an abundance of concern over the socio-economics
of conglomerate growth. Some people believe that the tax laws should not
encourage corporate marriages, 20 while others believe that the tax laws should
create actual barriers to corporate take-overs. 21 Indeed, a prominent practitioner in the field of modem corporate growth has suggested a special tax
in connection with such transactions.2 2 In another arena, we are all aware
of the recent antitrust interest in conglomerate acquisitions.28 We must be
18. 33 Fed. Reg. 11015-18, as amended, 33 Fed. Reg. 14109-10 (1968).
19. See Schmults & Kelly, Disclosure in Connection with Cash Take-Over Bids: The
New Regulations, 24 Bus. LAW. 19 (1968).
20. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 411 (1969);
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 101-11 (1969).
21. See generally Are The Conglomerates Finished? FORTUNE, May 15, 1969, at 135,
136.
22. James J. Ling, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Ling-Temco-Vought proposed that the Government levy a two percent tax on corporate consolidations. N.Y.
Times, April 18, 1969, at 61, col. 3.
23. See Davidow, supra note 2, at 1235; Congress Hears the Conglomerates, Bus.
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sure that the growing fear in Washington of conglomerates is accompanied
by an appreciation of the positive economic good which conglomerates can
achieve. Treating all conglomerates alike and meting out to all the severest
restrictions-while appropriate for certain purposes-may run the very
serious risk of overkill. The baby may well go out with the bath water.
There is ground on which I, as a securities-oriented student, can share
concern with those whose main fear is overconcentrated wealth. I do not
favor mixing wealth with water. There is a chance, especially with the ever
increasing flow of "funny money" into the market place, for conglomerates
to pump a great deal of water into the nation's capital structure. A problem
of the first order would result, but this problem, similar to those which used
to characterize the milieu of both the public utility holding company and the
investment company, is not without its remedy.
Institutional Investment
There has been a rapid development in the past few years toward institutionalization of our securities markets. 24 This means, simply, that more and
more of the outstanding equity is being acquired by financial intermediaries,
and that more and more of the activity in our markets is a reflection of
quickening activity by those institutions and those who would imitate them.
A brief sketch of the dimensions of this trend may be helpful.
In 1954, institutions owned $66 billion in equities, amounting to 25 percent of those then outstanding. By 1968, this group held $260 billion worth,
or about 34 percent of all outstanding equities. Bank trust accounts alone
accounted for an incredible $163 billion in stock holdings in 1968, the stock
assets of the five largest banks exceeding the total stock assets of all openend investment companies combined.
Institutionalization has been truly startling, not only in its scope, but in its
velocity. For instance, the net assets in the mutual fund industry now stand
at over $52 billion, almost $10 billion more than a year ago. 25 The entrance
of the insurance companies into the fund field, a development which has not
gone unnoticed, 26 adds an additional sales force potential of 200,000 to the
50,000 salesmen and brokerage representatives now selling fund shares. 27
This additional sales force has access to an estimated 130 million life inAug. 2, 1969, at 27; The Sharp New Line on Antitrust, Bus. WEEK, June 14,
1969, at 120; Some Candid Answers from James J. Ling, FORTUNE, Aug. 1, 1969, at 92.
24. See articles cited supra note 1.
25. Hershman, The Mutual Fund Explosion, DUN'S REV., July 1969, at 21, 25.

WEEK,

26. Id.

See also Sheehan, Life Insurance's Almighty Leap into Equities, FORTUNE,

Oct. 1968, at 142; Insurance Giants Move into Funds, Bus.
114.
27. Sheehan, supra note 26, at 144.

WEEK,

March 15, 1969, at
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surance policyholders. Five million Americans now own mutual fund shares,
a figure which is likely to double, at least, in the next five years, at which
time, with the continuation of the present rate of growth, the industry
should reach $100 billion in assets. Behind these figures lie truly startling
transactional volume and turnover figures; figures which are symptomatic of
the series of changes occurring in our nation's capital allocation.
Institutionalization of savings will direct more and more of public savings
into professionally managed vehicles, vehicles which place greater emphasis
on equity investment. It will be important to prove or disprove the contention that investment decisions by the advisors to such pools of capital
tend to become homogeneous largely because they reflect the decisions of a
relatively few money managers trained in similar techniques and constantly
peering over the shoulders of their colleagues and competitors. If a trend
to parallel decision-making develops, investment managers will be faced
with the possibility that their decisions will cause even larger swings in the
market and more pronounced reactions thereto, especially where markets,
because of the slower growth of available equities or their more rapid absorption by the institutions, are thin. This problem is made more urgent by
the fact that stock exchanges were designed as central meeting places where
relatively small buy and sell orders of individual investors could be matchednot the tens or hundreds of thousand share blocks which are becoming commonplace among trading institutions.2 8 The position of floor specialist was
developed to provide liquidity and correct temporary imbalances in the
supply and demand for particular stocks created by many relatively small
orders coming to the market on a random basis. The specialist no longer can,
alone, meet the large needs of the institutions.
Meanwhile, as the activities of the funds and other institutional investors
create their own disclosure needs, the smaller, individual investor will tend
to become lost even more in the maze of sophistication. He too will need
information upon which to trade, and his problems will be magnified as his
impact on the market diminishes. Traditional distinctions among financial
intermediaries are rapidly disappearing as the supermarket approach is
adopted by institutional investors. Banks, insurance companies, and others
have begun to form multi-faceted financial service organizations, called
financial conglomerates, or-to use a phrase designed to sound more
friendly---congenerics, to offer various services including equity based vehicles, both traditional and novel.2 9 The insurance companies are in the
28. Loomis, supra note 1, at 137.
29. Rose, The Case for the One-Bank Holding Company, FORTUNE, May 15, 1969,
at 163, 322, 326.
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mutual fund business and the banks are trying to test the water 8 0 The
distribution processes for such equity oriented products do not always follow
the traditional channels used in the securities business. They involve new
merchandising techniques which require assessment and response by the
regulators, state and federal, and by those now engaged in these activities.
We have all watched, with great interest, the development during the
past few years of the insurance-equity package, the variable annuity. With
this development many of the major life insurance companies have now
entered the mutual fund business directly. Not too long ago insurance men
laughed at a forecast of such a development. The problems with which
some life insurance companies are now struggling, in part, relate to a reorientation of sales attitudes and techniques. The need to teach sales forces,
inbred with the different concepts of life insurance, to sell mutual funds is
eloquent testimony to the strong rivalry that has existed between these two
investment (or savings) media. The advice of fund men to their clients to
"buy term and invest the difference" drew long and heated answers from the
life insurance men. But the trend is not one-way. Fund organizations are
entering the life insurance field (indeed, some started many years ago) and
are learning that the insurance sales message is just as difficult for fund
salesmen. 81
In the past, institutional investors such as mutual funds, bank trust departments and pension funds tended to be conservative, investing for the
long term. Recently, however, a "cult of performance" has emerged and
attention has been focused on those equities with the "best track records" in
the previous year or even six months.32 More of these institutions, particularly certain mutual funds, have become short term traders who act not
only with speed, but in volume. This emphasis on short term performance
has fed the fires of volume. It is not unusual for the so-called "go-go" funds
(or merely very aggressive common stock funds) to exceed 100 percent turnover rates in less than a year; and some of the activity generated by these
funds is highly speculative.
Other problems are developing from the growing emphasis on "instant
performance." One of these concerns valuation methods 8 and the validity
of values assigned through use of these methods to assets held by funds,
assets with significant restrictions on ready liquidation. We have already
witnessed the difficulties faced by one fund and its investors caught first by
inadequate internal procedures and then by the collapse in value of one
30.
31.
32.
33.

See articles cited supra notes 25 and 28.
Can Fifty Money Managers All be Wrong? FORBES, March 1, 1969, at 46.
Performance in Reverse? FORBES, March 15, 1969, at 58.
See Letter Stock is Worth the Worry, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 18, 1969, at 108.
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such portfolio security.8 4 Apart from the losses which may be suffered by
individual investors, and the damage to the image of other funds, this case
provides some clues as to the thinness of the ice on which some are skating.
Conclusion
I have chosen to focus upon problems-disclosure, conglomerates, and institutional investment-which illuminate some of the basic issues in today's
securities regulation. It seems that, as is the case with many areas of federal
regulatory law, the smooth running, trouble free aspects may well go unnoticed. There are members of the public who have the impression that
the Government considers itself as a colossal Interference Agency, specializing
in Monday morning quarterbacking. This impression is mildly accurate,
but woefully incomplete.
The main business of government relates to change and improvement.
In carrying on this function, the SEC is quite aware of the whole range
of benefits which the private sector contributes to the economy. It has in
the past enjoyed, and continues to thrive on, a cordial working partnership
with businessmen and their lawyers. For the most part, this partnership has
been tremendously successful.
The sophistication of financial markets, which continue to grow at what
appears to be a geometric rate, will continue to spin off new and subtle
versions of the securities problems I have discussed. In order to maintain
fundamental fairness in the securities markets, such problems will have to be
resolved. Resolution of problems presupposes a reasonable understanding
of the forces which create the problems, and those of us who inhabit the
securities world are obligated to speak out on the important issues. This
brief commentary is offered in partial satisfaction of my obligation.

34. See In re Mates Financial Services, CCH
Mates Checked, TIME, Jan. 3, 1969, at 61.
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